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Bur eaucratic inefficiency, patronage-induced overstaffing, and outright corruption retard economic development and reduce public well-being in developing countries. They prevent governments from effectively carrying out the economic plans to which they devote so much official attention, and deprive citizens of government services to which they are legally entitled.
The costs associated with bureaucratic deficiencies are widely recognized. Nevertheless, the initiation of reforms has proved difficult. In this essay I explain why reforms that are widely regarded as necessary and desirable often face such severe obstacles to their initiation. The explanation lies in the interests of the politicians who must make the decisions that would promote or impede reform. The heart of the argument is that these individuals frequently face a choice between actions that serve their individual political interests and actions that would improve the long-run welfare of their societies and that when this happens, individual interests generally prevail. Reforms only occur in political circumstances that render the individual interests of the politicians who must initiate them consistent with the collective interest in reform.
Struggles over administrative reform have developed in virtually all countries in which political competition preceded the establishment of a professionalized state apparatus. The initiation of reform entailed as bitter a struggle in Britain and the United States during the nineteenth century as in Latin America during the twentieth century. Numerous case studies of the initiation of reforms exist-but few general explanations.
I suggest a general explanation. In this article I shall use simple game-theoretic models to explore how different electoral and party systems affect the incentives of legislators to initiate reforms. The analysis focuses on one type of reform, the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 85 NO. 2 JUNE 1991 introduction of merit-based hiring for civil servants. This aspect of reform was selected for emphasis because the many administrative reform packages proposed during recent decades nearly always include it; because rules for merit-based hiring, unlike other kinds of reform, vary only moderately from country to country; and because the effects of laws requiring recruitment by exam are relatively easy to assess. Meritocratic recruitment is not always the most important aspect of administrative reform; but it is always at least moderately important, and it is the easiest element of reform to "measure" and compare across nations. I analyze the legislative struggle over reform in South American democracies,' of which some have initiated reforms, and some have not. The choice of this set of cases holds roughly constant several variables that are often mentioned as possible causes of honesty and competence in government: culture, colonial institutional structure, and level of economic development. At the same time, it preserves sufficient variance in contemporary political institutions and reform outcomes to allow the testing of hypotheses.
The Need for Reform
Demand for reform in Latin America resulted from widespread recognition that the traditional use of government resources for partisan purposes had led to excesses. In Uruguay during the 1950s and 1960s, for example, so large a fraction of the budgets of many government agencies went for wages to pay patronage appointees that there were no funds left for operating expenses. In 1960, Montevideo newspapers reported that because the Ministry of Public Health had created 1,449 new jobs in public hospitals, no money was left to buy medicines and essential hospital equipment (Taylor 1960, 222) . The Ministry of Public Works hired 313 new employees during one seven-month period to repair equipment. Since no funds remained to buy spare parts, by the end of the period none of the department's many self-propelled road scrapers remained operable, and all work on the roads had ceased. The "entire budget was being used to pay personnel and none was left for fuel, equipment, and materials" (Taylor 1960, 103, 178-79) .
Overstaffing is only one of the forms government inefficiency can take. In 1983 a group of Peruvian researchers set out to acquire a license to operate a small workshop in Lima. Documenting every step and moving as expeditiously as procedure allowed, they found that it took 289 days to obtain the 11 separate licenses and certificates legally required. Along the way, they were solicited for bribes 10 times (de Soto 1986, 173-75) .
As governments in the region began trying to promote economic development and as state intervention in economies increased, the need for administrative reform to increase the effectiveness of developmental strategies became increasingly obvious and urgent. Technical experts claimed that intervention in the economy would not produce desired effects unless the individuals making and carrying out policies were better trained (e.g., Emmerich 1960 Emmerich , 1972 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1961), presidents regularly proposed administrative reforms as elements of their development strategies (e.g., Brewer-Carias 1975a; Morcillo 1975) , political party leaders espoused support for reform (Brewer-Carias 1975a; Groves 1974; Urzuia and Garcia 1971) , the press campaigned energetically against corruption and incompetence in the bureaucracy and called for reform (Gonza'lez 1980; Lopez Pintor 1972; Taylor 1960; Urzuia and Garcia 1971) , and ordinary people expressed a desire for 372 more competent and honest government in their answers to survey questions.2
Impediments to Reform
In spite of widespread support, however, reforms have occurred only slowly and sporadically. Two groups have opposed reform: those who have found in bureaucratic jobs a "refuge from which to make a last-ditch stand for their right to a quiet, incompetent existence" (Hirschman 1958, 154) and elected politicians and party activists. The opposition of employees who gained their jobs through patronage reflects the expected costs of reform to them. But perhaps less obviously, administrative reform is also costly to the politicians who must enact it. Traditionally, jobs in the bureaucracy and the multitude of contracts, subsidies, exceptions, and other scarce values distributed by bureaucrats have served as important electoral resources. Politicians and officials have been able to trade help in acquiring these resources for support (Biles 1972 (Biles , 1978 Singer 1965; Valenzuela 1977) .
Administrative reform threatens to eliminate these political resources. Reforms that introduce merit as the main criterion for hiring and promotion decrease the ability of politicians and party leaders to reward supporters with jobs. Efficiency criteria applied to bureaucratic procurement procedures reduce political discretion in the awarding of contracts. The use of economic and technical criteria rather than partisan favoritism to decide who gets subsidized credit, access to foreign exchange, tax exemptions, and so on further reduces the resources politicians can exchange for support.
The cost of administrative reform to politicians and party activists is thus clear. Under certain circumstances, however, administrative reform may also provide them with benefits. If the national economy improves as a result of increasing the competence of officials and the effectiveness of their decisions, incumbent politicians and their party can claim credit for it in the next election. Moreover, politicians and their party may gain support from voters who favor reform. Politicians may gain a sense of satisfaction from having helped provide the country with more honest and competent administration. A final possibility is that as the electorate grows, politicians and party leaders will prefer to switch from offering private goods in exchange for support to offering public goods, because, in a mass electorate, public goods cost politicians less per voter reached (Cox 1986) .
To explain why reforms have occurred at some times and places but not others, then, one must answer the question, Under what circumstances will the benefits of reform outweigh the costs to the politicians who must at least acquiesce in passing them?
The Interests of Legislators and Party Leaders
Whether politicians will initiate administrative reform depends on the incentives they confront. Only if the individual aspirations for power, status, wealth, or policy change on the part of political activists and politicians can be furthered by the provision of reforms will they be provided. A formalization of the incentive structures faced by South American politicians making a choice about whether to use their limited resources to consolidate political support in customary ways or to bring about more efficient administration will yield predictions of when such reforms should occur. Two groups of political actors play a role in the struggle over reform: elected politicians and party leaders (who often hold no elected office). Simplifying somewhat, one can hypothesize that these individuals want, above all, to further their 373 political careers. Given this first-order preference, their strategic second-order preferences will vary, depending on the specific possibilities available to them.
The interests of elected officials in Latin America resemble the interests of politicians elsewhere. They want to be reelected,3 and they prefer some policies over others. Without doing them too much of an injustice, we can assume that for most politicians most of the time, the desire to be elected takes precedence over policy preferences (see Ames 1987) . For some, the desire for office and its perquisites truly overwhelms their commitment to particular policies. Others may want to be elected only in order to enact preferred policies; but if they fail to be elected, they lose their chance of influencing policy outcomes. Thus, even for the public-spirited, the preference for election will be strong, since election grants the opportunity to achieve other preferences (see Mayhew 1975) . This is not to deny that for some politicians, ideological commitments outweigh the desire to be elected. The electoral process, however, tends to weed out such individuals; they are elected less frequently than those who consider winning of paramount importance. This selection process also contributes to the predominance of electoral motives among those who have already achieved office. As an initial simplification, then, suppose politicians compete with each other in a zero-sum electoral game, and that for those who compete in it, the desire to win this electoral game overrides other goals.
Party leaders further their careers by increasing the electoral success of their parties and by achieving greater influence within their parties. Many of their goals will thus coincide with those of politicians in their parties, since both politicians and party leaders benefit from policies that give their party electoral advantages. In certain other respects, however, their interests diverge. Party leaders benefit from policies that advance the interests of the party as a collectivity over the long run, whereas, in some situations, individual candidates may be injured by such policies. Party leaders, for example, favor rules that enforce party discipline; but in some circumstances individual legislators may be able to improve their electoral chances by breaking ranks. Situations may thus arise in which party leaders have interests not shared by the average legislator. Party leaders must then deploy the incentives at their disposal to influence legislators' votes.
The importance of party leaders in the struggle over reform depends on how much they influence candidates' electoral chances. Virtually all Latin American countries elect legislators using systems of proportional representation. The factors that contribute to the probability that candidates will win elections depend on how candidate lists are selected and whether lists are closed (placement on lists being determined by party leaders) or open (determined by voters). In open list systems, the vote for candidates depends on the popularity of their positions on issues, voters' party loyalty, candidates' personal charisma, and constituency services, patronage, and favors-much as it does in winner-take-all systems such as the United States. In closed list systems, the candidate's probability of winning depends primarily on the candidate's position on the party list. Factors such as charisma, issue position, and constituency service affect the candidate's probability of winning by influencing party leaders' decisions about placement on the list more than by influencing the vote directly.
In systems in which party leaders' control over the list determines who is elected, they exercise great power over the Patronage ' I + xl, V2-XIVI + x,-x2, v2 + x2-xl Note: Politicians' utilities are assumed linear with the probability of winning the next election. Vi = the probability that candidate i will be elected if no jobs are distributed for political purposes. Figure  1 . In this simplified world, each politician has some baseline probability of winning the next election, vi, determined by voters' party loyalty, issue preferences, and so on. This baseline probability can be increased by the skillful use of political favors and decreased by his opponents' distribution of favors. The payoffs in these matrices reflect the amounts of patronage to which a national party machine has access as a result of its participation in government. Because of the centralization of decision making and resources in Latin America, the patronage resources available to legislators depend more on their party's national position than on local resources.
The matrix in Figure 1 shows the incentives faced by candidates from different parties as they decide whether to use patronage to secure votes during an electoral campaign. The top left cell of the matrix shows the candidates' probabilities of winning when neither distributes favors; these are just the baseline probabilities vl and v2. In the lower left cell, Politician 1 uses patronage, gaining an electoral advantage of xi from it; the opponent, who does not use patronage, then suffers a decline in probability of The reform fails to pass so both parties continue to distribute patronage. The minority party gains a small amount of credit at the majority's expense for its vote for reform. Whether legislators will vote for reform when they face the incentives schematized in Figure 2 depends on the relative magnitudes of xi and x2. If (xi -x2) > e, that is, if xi is any significant amount larger than x2, the majority party will vote against reform, and it will fail. If, however, xl andx2, are approximately equal, that is, if the two parties have approximately equal access to patronage resources, the majority party will vote for reform, and it will pass.4 The minority party, as long as e has any positive value at all, will always prefer reform.
To reiterate in nontechnical language, in an election, all candidates can be expected to rely on patronage, as shown in Figure 1 . Members of a party disadvantaged by the distribution of patronage resources, however, would be better off if Legislator from Reform Vl, v2v, + e, V2-e Majority Party Patronage + XI -x-e, VI + XI-x2, V2 + X2 -XI h+ e v2+X2 XI Note: xi and vi are defined as in Figure 1 . e = the amount of cr 376 the merit system were imposed on everyone. Thus, they always have an incentive to support reform in the legislature. Giving up the use of patronage would make them better off as long as everyone else also gave it up. As many observers have noted, the reform issue generally appeals to the "outs" in politics.
Where patronage is equally distributed and politicians can gain even a small amount from a vote for reform, members of both parties have reason to vote for it. In this situation, patronage conveys no relative advantage, but voting for reform may improve electoral chances. Consequently, political interest dictates the passage of reform. The matrix demonstrates the logic underlying these conclusions for political systems dominated by two large parties or coalitions, but the same argument would hold if three or more parties played central roles in electoral competition. Then patronage would need to be distributed approximately equally among all the top parties before it would be rational for legislators in the larger parties to vote for it.
Members of a party with greater access to patronage have no incentive to vote for reform in the legislature and no reason to eschew patronage during the electoral campaign either. They can improve their chances of being elected by relying on patronage, no matter what members of the other party do and no matter how long the situation continues. Members of a party with more access to patronage, then, could be expected to opt for reform only if they thought other gains from voting for reform would outweigh the certain costs that the loss of patronage would entail. One can imagine a situation in which public outrage over bureaucratic incompetence and graft had become so vehement that politicians might fear that they would lose more votes by voting against reform than by reducing their ability to distribute patronage. If public outrage very often reached such proportions, however, legislators would be eager rather than reluctant reformers.
Descriptions of the reform movement in the United States suggest that public outrage over the assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed office seeker played a catalytic role in bringing about reform (Van Riper 1958, 88-94) .
Even in this case, however, the legislature voted to pass the reform only after the election of 1882. This election, more than a year after Garfield's death, gave Democrats a majority in the House and thus marked the end of the Republicans' postCivil War dominance over patronage. A few months prior to the 1882 election, the House had "derisively and angrily refused to give a paltry sum and to aid a single experiment of reform" (Hall 1884, 462) . Immediately after the election, faced with the prospect of sharing the spoils in the immediate future, the same representatives who had ignored public opinion five months earlier passed the Pendleton Act by an overwhelming majority (Van Riper 1958, 94) . Most of the time, legislators and party leaders can afford to ignore the public's desire for reform because reform is only one of many issues that affect voters' choices and is rarely-perhaps never-the most important issue to most voters.
To summarize the argument so far, the payoff matrices imply a prediction that spoils will be outlawed in democracies when two conditions are met, namely, that the benefits of patronage are approximately evenly distributed among the larger parties, and legislators have some small incentive to vote for reform.
Such reforms may turn out to be fragile if access to patronage again becomes onesided, a subject to which I will return below. For now, let us look in more detail at how the game-theoretic prediction fares when confronted with evidence from the Latin American democracies. In the real world there is no way to measure amounts of patronage or how much influence on the vote it has. In the case studies that follow, I deal with these measurement problems by relying on two plausible assumptions. First, all else equal, the distribution of jobs and favors increases the probability of being elected (otherwise politicians would not expend so much of their energy providing such services); the more a politician distributes, the better the politician's chances. Second, the amount of patronage to which a candidate has access for distribution depends on the party's control of elective and administrative offices at the national level, which in turn depends on the party's present and past electoral success. Electoral victories allow the more successful party to appoint its adherents to bureaucratic posts. These appointees become the source of the favors that influence later elections. (Generally, a waning party that has lost many of the seats it formerly held in the legislature will still be able to call upon loyalists in the bureaucracy for a number of years.) These assumptions permit an approximate rank ordering of each party's access to patronage, a level of measurement sufficient for the simple model used here. They imply that if two parties control roughly equal numbers of seats in the legislature over a period of years, each party will have access to about the same amount of patronage. If, in contrast, one party dominates the legislature, we can assume that it also dominates patronage opportunities.
Colombia
Competition between the Liberal and Conservative parties for control of government and the spoils associated with control has structured all of Colombia's modem history. Until 1958, transfers of power from one party to the other were accompanied by large-scale turnovers of personnel and partisan violence (Solazn 1980 Colombia's next attempt to establish merit as the basis for recruitment to the civil service occurred in 1958. At that time, each of the major parties controlled exactly half of the legislature and half of the available administrative appointments. This was due to a pact-the National Front-between the Liberal and Conservative parties that established parity between the two traditional rivals in the national legislature, in departmental (i.e., state) legislatures, in municipal councils, and in administrative appointments. This pact, designed to end a decade of repression and partisan violence in which more than 200 thousand people had been killed, was scheduled to remain in effect for 16 years. Each party would receive 50% of the seats in legislatures and councils. The presidency was to alternate between the two parties. A career civil service was proposed as a means of removing key jobs from partisan control, and other administrative jobs were to be distributed equally between supporters of the two parties. In short, the pact established an equal sharing of power and patronage, regardless of electoral outcomes for 16 years (Berry, Hellman, and Solafin 1980; Dix 1980; Hartlyn 1988) .
The pact called for the creation of a merit-based career civil service, but presidential and legislative action were required to initiate it (Groves 1974; Morcillo 1975) . Individual legislators facing this decision about whether to forego a portion of customary patronage would have to consider the electoral costs and benefits associated with patronage, as shown in Figure 2 . By law, each party could claim an equal share of patronage. Nevertheless, no individual legislator could afford to eschew the use of patronage unilaterally. Two factors contributed to making a vote for reform more attractive than it might otherwise have been. The first was the interest of all politicians in reestablishing a democratic system, which depended on ending partisan violence. Administrative reform was expected to help end the violence by providing a fair means of distributing jobs and also by contributing to better quality economic policy. Leaders in both parties had committed themselves to agreements, including complicated parity arrangements as well as civil service reform, as a way of reducing the violence and reestablishing a competitive political system. Thus, party elites had managed to forge an enforceable cooperative solution to the prisoner's dilemma of unrestrained party competition. The career interests of high-level party leaders in reestablishing the competitive electoral system explain their support for the pact. Legislators' second reason for voting for reform was the expectation that it would affect future placement on electoral lists. Party leaders in Colombia at that time could influence 379 legislators' decisions with special effectiveness because of party cohesion and a closed list proportional representation system (see Duff 1971) . Although the proliferation of factions within Colombia's two major parties during the pact subsequently reduced the influence of party leaders over legislators, in 1958 both parties were still relatively cohesive (Archer 1990 ).
Evidence from the Colombian case is thus completely consistent with the model. Reform occurred when access to patronage was distributed equally. Party discipline enforced by the closed list system provided legislators with an additional incentive to vote for reform.
Uruguay
In Uruguay, the career civil service was first mandated by the 1934 constitution. This constitution legalized a pact between two factions of the traditional dominant parties, the terrista faction of the Colorado party and the herrerista faction of the National, or Blanco, party.
Uruguay has historically had a twoparty system within which multiple factions have independent legal status and run their own lists of candidates in elections, thus creating a de facto multiparty system. Prior to the reform, Gabriel Terra, head of the terrista faction, had been elected president on the Colorado ticket. In the face of severe economic distress caused by the Depression and an apparently insurmountable policy immobilism caused by Uruguay's collegial executive and powerful but factionalized legislature, Terra staged a coup d'etat in 1933. Luis Alberto Herrera, caudillo of the most important Blanco party faction at the time, collaborated with Terra; and the two faction leaders entered into a pact to share government offices, excluding other factions of both parties (Taylor 1960, 23-29) .
The sitting legislature was dismissed. (Taylor 1960, 171) . At the same time, it excluded other factions from access to spoils. In effect, it transformed what had been a de facto multiparty system into a two-party system with approximately equal access to patronage for both parties. Traditionally, the Colorado party had attracted more electoral support and controlled more patronage than had the Blancos. More popular parties usually have access to more patronage, but the pact resulted in an equal division of patronage in spite of electoral inequality. In this setting, the Constituent Assembly was able to agree to establish a career civil service, which would remove some appointments from the discretion of party activists. As in Colombia, the closed list system provided faction leaders with incentives they could deploy to affect the votes of members of the Constituent Assembly.
This brief period of relative equality between two factions was unique in Uruguayan history. The two parties achieved approximate equality in electoral strength in 1962 and 1971, but the largest factions within each party remained unequal (Fabregat 1963, 6:31; Rial 1985, 12-13; Venturini 1984, 25, 50) . No legislation passed to enforce the principle of merito-380 cratic hiring in practice. Legislative and constitutional additions to the civil service law after the 1930s generally focused on providing job security, vacations, grievance procedures, and so on. In other words, later additions to the civil service laws were designed to benefit well-organized civil servants and thus contribute to electoral gains for legislators-not to require further sacrifice of electoral interests.
Venezuela
At the beginning of the democratic period in Venezuela, administrative reform seemed to be supported by everyone. Excessive corruption had helped discredit the dictator, Marcos P6rez Jimenez; and administrative reform was widely seen as needed, both to reduce corruption and to improve the state's ability to use oil revenues to foster development and increase social welfare. President R6mulo Betancourt expressed strong support for reform, foreign experts were hired to help formulate a reform and train Venezuelans to implement it, and a reform agency attached to the presidency was created (Brewer-Carias 1975a , 1975b Stewart 1978) .
The agency completed its draft plan for civil service reform in 1960, and the president submitted it to Congress. The president had a coalition majority in Congress.
Since party discipline in Venezuela is strong (in part because of party leaders' control of electoral lists), prospects for reform should have been good. Nevertheless, the civil service reform bill was never reported out of committee (Groves 1967) .
It continued, moreover, to languish in Congress throughout the Betancourt presidency and through that of his successor, Raul Leoni. Venezuelan observers note that despite flamboyant public statements supporting reform, neither president really pushed the bill (Brewer-Carias 1975a, 454-57) . Throughout this period, the party Acci on Democritica (AD) controlled the presidency and a strong plurality in Congress. The AD leaders had much more to lose from giving up patronage than leaders of the other parties.
In 1968 Rafael Caldera of the Social Christian party (COPEI) was elected president with 28.9% of the vote, as compared with the AD-led coalition vote of 28.1%. In the legislature, the vote was split between the two largest parties, with 25.8% for AD and 24.2% for COPEI (Ruddle and Gillette 1972). The civil service reform was brought forward for consideration in Congress again, revised to make it congruent with recent constitutional and institutional changes, and passed in 1970 with support from both AD and COPES (Brewer-Carias 1975a, 475-79; Stewart 1978, 39-40) . Thus, Venezuela's first merit-based civil service law also passed during a period of temporary equality between parties. But after the return to democracy, earlier reforms were to a considerable extent undermined (Siegel 1966, 148-75) .
From the establishment of democracy until the military coup in 1964, the distribution of electoral strength and patronage in Brazil was quite unequal. The country had a multiparty system with open list proportional representation in the lower house and a majoritarian system in the Senate. The three most important parties were the Partido Social Democratico (PSD, a traditional, conservative party despite its name), the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB, the Labor party), and the Uniao Democrdtica Nacional (UDN, a middle-class reformist party). The PSD and PTB had developed from the traditional and labor wings of the political machine created by Vargas during the dictatorship (Oliveira 1973; Souza 1976 ). They were entrenched in the government bureaucracy prior to Vargas's overthrow, and their patronage resources remained impressive throughout the democratic period. In spite of apparently important ideological differences, the PSD and PTB formed frequent electoral alliances. The UDN, in contrast, developed in opposition to the Vargas political machine (Benevides 1981) . Over the years it achieved some access to patronage as a result of entering coalitions and winning some elections, but it never equaled the other parties. During the 1950s and 1960s, as economic development became the most important goal of the Brazilian government, concern about administrative reform reached new levels. Presidents Getulio Vargas (during his second administration), Juscelino Kubitschek, and JAnio Quadros all proposed reforms (Graham 1968, 143-53) . Public demand for reform, as expressed in the press and in answers to survey questions, was widespread. For example, a 1964 survey asked, "Which one of these do you think our country needs most: an honest government without corruption; a government that gets things done; a fair distribution of wealth; national unity; or individual freedom?" Even though the income distribution in Brazil was one of the most skewed in the world, 62% of those who answered chose "an honest government without corruption." The second-most-frequent choice was "a government that gets things done."6 When asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "The only really important problem in Brazil is the problem of lack of character and honesty," only 15% of those who had an opinion disagreed. When asked the most important reason for their party preference, 44% mentioned honesty first, more than twice as many as mentioned party program or past record.7
Even in the face of such expressions of public opinion, however, legislators making the decision whether or not to vote for reform had to take into account the costs and benefits associated with patronage. Members of the UDN would have been better off if they had been able to pass a reform. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the UDN espoused "the struggle against the forces that have been dominant for many years of administrative corruption" (Pinto 1960 ) in platforms, campaigns, and speeches. Individual members of the party could still improve their chances of being elected, however, by relying on promises of patronage during the campaign.
Members of the UDN behaved as would be expected, given the costs and benefits they faced. Most members relied on patronage and deals in electoral campaigns but advocated the passage of reform bills in Congress (Geddes 1990 ). This stance, though rational, left them vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy from both idealists within the party and opponents outside.
In contrast, PSD and PTB legislators had no reason to vote for reform and every reason to continue relying on patronage during electoral campaigns. During the democratic period, the career civil service remained on the books; but control over new hiring returned, for the most part, to the realm of patronage. Congress reduced the status and powers of the Departamento Administrativo de Serviso Puiblico (DASP), the agency in charge of enforcing civil service laws (Siegel 1966, 148-72) . During much of the democratic period, exams were not held and appointments were made in the temporary and extranumerary (i.e., outside the merit system) categories of employment. The dividing line between meritbased career and noncareer civil servants was blurred by the passage of laws con-382 ferring career civil service status and perquisites on "temporary" employees who had not taken the exam but who had spent five years or more in public employment (Graham 1968, 140-58) .
Reform laws were proposed at various times; but only two kinds of civil service laws made it through Congress: those which granted benefits to civil servants and thus involved no electoral cost to legislators and those which extended meritocratic norms into agencies controlled by one particular party and thus involved gains rather than costs for the majority of legislators. In the realm of granting benefits, Congress increased the wages of civil servants and passed several laws granting job security and higher status to unclassified employees.
The one exception to the overall decline in the merit-based civil service during the democratic period occurred when Congress extended the merit system to cover the social security institutes. Thousands of jobs in these institutes had been used during the second Vargas and Kubitschek presidencies to reward the presidents' Labor party (PTB) coalition partner (Amaral 1966, 17-19; Siegel 1963, 6 ). Hiring in the institutes had, in effect, been turned over to Labor party activists. By voting to include the institutes in the merit system, members of Congress from other parties could decrease the resources available to the Labor party without incurring any cost themselves. Given the unusual circumstance of the existence of a group of agencies dominated by one particular party, the vote for reform did not depend on parity in the legislature.
Chile
During its long history of democracy, Chile never passed a comprehensive civil service reform. It had no civil service commission and no uniform system of recruitment and promotion (Valenzuela 1984, 256; Lopez Pintor 1972) . It did have some requirements for entry, such as completion of the tenth grade; but even these were violated in practice. Each agency controlled its own recruitment system. As a result, some agencies were highly professionalized, others extremely politicized (Ascher, 1975, 57-86; Urzuia and Garcia 1971, 175-78) .
The Chilean party system was far more fragmented than those of the other countries discussed. Traditionally, the Radical party had greatest access to patronage. Radical party dominance began to decline in the early 1950s, but no conjuncture occurred that gave approximately equal patronage to the largest parties in Congress (Valenzuela 1985, 44-47) .
Two characteristics of the Chilean democratic system further decreased the likelihood of passing a reform: the open list system of proportional representation initiated in 1958 and the fragmented party system. It might appear at first that in a fragmented party system such as Chile's, in which the "dominant" party often receives only 20%-30% of the vote in legislative elections, several smaller parties could band together to pass reforms that would deprive the largest party of its disproportionate access to patronage. In this way, a group of smaller parties with less access to patronage could improve their ability to compete against the party with the closest ties to the bureaucracy.
In an open list system, however, incumbents' interest in maintaining their advantage over competitors in their own parties outweighs their interest in depriving members of other parties of access to patronage resources. In open list systems, the candidate's place on the party list is determined by the vote the candidate receives. In other words, a candidate runs not only against candidates from other parties but also against other candidates from his or her own party.
Patronage thus becomes an even more valuable resource to the candidates who have access to it. Candidates can distin-guish themselves from the candidates of other parties on the basis of programmatic appeals, offers of public goods, and ideology; but attention to casework and the distribution of private goods are among the few ways of distinguishing themselves from other candidates in the same party. Incumbents have a great advantage over other candidates in terms of their ability to distribute favors. Consequently, incumbents of all parties in an open list proportional representation system can be expected to be especially reluctant to give up patronage.
Had Chilean party leaders had an interest in reducing reliance on patronage, they might have succeeded in overcoming incumbents' reluctance to vote for reform. Despite the open list system, Chilean party leaders (in contrast to Brazilian) have substantial influence over the political careers of legislators. They influence them through control over who achieves a place on the list, whose name appears at the top of the ballot (and thus receives a disproportionate share of the votes of the unsophisticated), and who receives cabinet appointments, often a stepping-stone to executive office. Given the unequal distribution of patronage among parties and the importance of patronage to the organizational survival of parties, however, party leaders had no interest in reform.
The fragmented party system necessitated government by coalition. Agreements on the distribution of spoils among coalition partners held these coalitions together (Valenzuela 1978; L6pez Pintor 1972, 89) . Even if the president's party had been willing to make an agreement with the opposition to eschew patronage, it could not have done so because disintegration of its governing coalition would almost certainly have followed. Such an agreement with the opposition would, in effect, constitute defection in the ongoing cooperative game between the president and his coalition partners; and he could expect to be punished by loss of support for defection.
Given the fragmented party system, unequal access to patronage, open list proportional representation, and the need for coalitions in order to govern, the game-theoretic approach would predict no civil service reform in Chile; and none occurred. With regard to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an initial reform, then, game-theoretic predictions seem to be consistent with events in all the countries examined.
The Return of an Unequal Distribution of Patronage Up to this point, I have dealt with the situations in which the first step toward a merit-based civil service was taken. I turn now to consideration of whether these initial steps have been, or will be, followed by others. Given the notorious inefficiency of postreform bureaucracies in Venezuela, Colombia, and Uruguay, one must conclude either that civil service reform does not work in Latin America or that initial reforms were subsequently undermined.
Evidence suggests that professionalization does occur and does increase competence and public service orientations in the parts of the bureaucracy in which it occurs (Hartwig 1983; Lafer 1964; Schmidt 1974; Vieira 1967; Wahrlich 1964 ) but that initial reforms affect only a small part of the bureaucracy. Where conjunctures favoring the passage of reforms have lasted only a short time, additional increments of reform have not followed initial reforms. Further, subsequent legislation and executive decrees have sometimes vitiated earlier reforms.
In Venezuela, when the AD returned to its then-customary dominant role with the election of Carlos Andres Perez in 1973, nonpartisan administration suffered a setback. Perez won the presidency with a strong plurality (48.4%, compared with 36.7% for COPEI). He was the first elected Venezuelan president to have an 384 absolute majority in both houses of Congress (Karl 1982, 182-84) . He asked forand eventually got-special powers to enact by executive decree a package of proposals aimed at controlling and using effectively the windfall of oil money threatening to engulf the nation. Included among these projects were several administrative reforms. P6rez expressed strong support for administrative reform, including professionalization of personnel. His actions, however, tended to belie his words.
Decree 211, issued by Perez, allowed the administration to increase the number of nonclassified public employees (i.e., temporary and low-status employees who need not pass exams to enter the service), as well as the number of positions de confianza (high-status appointments in which loyalty is considered an appropriate criterion for recruitment). Employees de confianza in 1982 included all division chiefs, those employed in fiscal sections, buying, supplies, and document reproduction, and all secretaries in these areas. COPEI claimed that 80 thousand people had lost their jobs for political reasons during the administration turnover when Perez came to power (Karl 1982, 267) . P6rez, in other words, took the opportunity provided by having a majority in the legislature to build the political machine that would form the foundation of his second successful campaign for the presidency (Geddes n.d., chap. 6) .
Some administrative reforms have occurred, however, since the P6rez adminis-
tration. An anticorruption law, for example, was passed in 1982 when AD and COPEI each received 39.7% of the vote in legislative elections.8 The problem of professionalizing personnel, however, remains unsolved (Brewer-Carias 1985) .9
Partisan considerations still affect most hiring decisions, and turnover in the bureaucracy when a new administration comes into power is so high that administrative output falls noticeably (Cova and Hannot 1986) . Corruption continues to be a serious problem. The situation in Uruguay resembled that in Venezuela, but in a more extreme form. After the end of the pact between Terra and Herrera, Uruguay never again experienced equality among the largest party factions. The 1934 constitution mandated that hiring and promotion be based on merit but did not establish an agency to conduct exams. Instead, each bureaucratic entity set its own standards. Some evidence about the strictness of these standards can be inferred from education statistics. Of public employees in the mid-1950s 46% had not finished primary school, and 70% had completed 10 or fewer years of schooling (Taylor 1960, 215-19) . Entrance exams in many agencies guaranteed little more than literacy. There was one important barrier to entry, however; applicants were not permitted to take the test unless it was signed by the neighborhood sublema (i.e., party faction) boss (see Biles 1972 Biles , 1978 .
Most legislation regarding the civil service and additional provisions added to subsequent constitutions dealt with job security and grievance procedures. These issues involve no cost to legislators as long as the number of jobs keeps expanding and brings them electoral benefits in the form of support from government employees (estimated at 27.6% of the working population of Uruguay in 1956; see Taylor 1960, 100) .
As a result of this series of laws and constitutional provisions, by the 1960s it had become virtually impossible to dismiss government employees. The 1952 constitution provides that the Senate must approve the dismissal of a classified employee. Even the dismissal of temporary employees has led to serious political repercussions (Taylor 1960, 215) . As noted, such a large proportion of agency budgets was spent on wages that at times, agencies could not afford to buy equipment needed in order to carry out their 385 functions and supply government services.
To summarize, in Uruguay's factionalized political system, legislators supported the elements of career civil service that could be converted into electoral advantage, especially job creation and job security. They did not provide for the imposition of merit as the criterion for hiring and promotion, which would have reduced the ability of factions to service their clients.
The pattern of implementation of the 1958 reform in Colombia resembles that in Uruguay. Once parity between the two major parties was established, competition among the factions within each party for shares of the party's half intensified.
Struggles for patronage among factions of the same party became increasingly vitriolic over time. As in Uruguay, the party pact has led to a sharp increase in the number of government jobs.
All Colombian presidents during the early democratic period made some effort at administrative reform, and quite a few reforms gained legislative approval.
Merit-based hiring has been an exception, however. By 1966 when Carlos Lleras Restrepo came to power, only 5% of public employees were included in the merit-based career civil service. Lleras mounted an aggressive campaign against corruption and patronage and for administrative reform. Congress, however, successfully blocked his proposed personnel reform. Unable to extend the merit system to cover more jobs, near the end of his term Lleras issued a decree allowing public employees to enroll themselves in the career service without taking the exam, thus undermining the meritocratic element of civil service.
As the party pact neared its end, conflict between the parties increased and interest in administrative reform waned, even in the executive branch. With the failure to extend the merit system, civil service in Colombia, as in Uruguay, had become synonymous with inflexibility and the inability to fire incompetents (Hartlyn 1988) . Misael Pastrana, the last president during the pact, showed little interest in reform, being more interested in consolidating his party's position before the first election unfettered by parity agreements. His successor, Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, suspended the career civil service during a state of siege. The general assessment by observers of the current Colombian scene is that professionalization of some key sectors of the Colombian bureaucracy has occurred but personnel reform in general has failed (Hartwig 1983; Vidal Perdomo 1982) . In spite of considerable presidential support, campaigns against corruption in the press, and supportive public opinion, legislators in the factionalized party system have not found it in their own interest to extend the merit system. Since the end of the Nation- Civil service reforms generally include two kinds of provisions: (1) requirements for merit-based hiring and promotion and (2) guarantees to employees of job security, fair treatment, union representation, and so on. In unequal or fragmented party systems, legislators have been reluctant to increase the number of jobs included in the merit system, since each new inclusion reduces the resources available to politicians and party leaders for use in their struggle with each other. Laws extending perquisites and job guarantees to larger numbers of employees have posed no problem for legislators, however, since they bring electoral benefits from grateful employees.
Implications for the Future of Reform
In the United States, where both parties enjoyed similar access to patronage from 1882 until 1896, civil service was gradually extended "by executive order, taking advantage of feeble statutory authorization" (Schattschneider 1942, 138) . By 1896 the merit system had been extended to cover about half of all appointments, which included "the bulk of the offices which it was then either legal or politically and administratively practical to place under the merit system" (Van Riper 1958, 130) . Most of these extensions occurred when the party in control of government had lost an election and expected the incoming party to dismiss its supporters (Skowronek 1979) . This pattern of incremental extension was possible because, in a system of two approximately equal parties, occasions recur when it is temporarily in the interest of one party or the other to extend the merit system. Over time, this series of instrumental decisions creates a professional civil service. The same thing is likely to happen in South America but will take longer because of differences in party systems. The initial establishment of a merit-based civil service, an agency to administer it, and (usually) a school to train civil servants creates islands of competence within the bureaucracy and concentrates advocates of further reform strategically inside government. Though they lose many battles, they rarely disappear from the scene completely.
Reform continues to be strenuously advocated both within the executive branch of government and in the press. Elected officials, however, often feel reluctant to extend reform. Even in the two countries with two-party systems, the institutionalization of factions that run separate electoral lists has transferred the struggle for patronage from a struggle between parties into a struggle among factions within each party. This makes it extremely unlikely that equality can be maintained for any length of time, since it must be maintained among factions, not just parties.
Multiparty systems in Latin America have so far not produced lasting periods of relative equality between the two most popular parties or coalitions. One party has usually tended to dominate, and it has not served that party's interest to extend the merit system. If two approximately equal parties were to emerge as the only serious competitors for power in a multiparty system, however (as seems quite possible in Venezuela), the game-theoretic model would predict further extensions of reform; and some extensions have occurred in Venezuela.
Conclusion
The very simple game-theoretic model proposed implies two predictions about when administrative reform should occur:
(1) reforms are more likely to pass the legislative hurdle when patronage is evenly distributed between the strongest parties, and (2) initial reforms are more likely to be followed by further extension of reform where the electoral weight of the 387 two top parties remains relatively even and stable.
The rational actor assumptions on which the model is based also imply several predictions about the effects of certain institutions on the probability of reform. Open list proportional representation, for example, because it makes patronage a valuable resource to incumbents in their struggle against challengers within their own party, reduces the probability of reform. Electoral rules that result in the proliferation of candidate lists (e.g., minimal requirements for party qualification or easy formation of dissident electoral lists within parties) also reduce the probability of reform because fractionalization reduces the probability of an equal distribution of patronage among the larger parties. Institutional features of the party system that give party leaders more influence over legislators (such as control over placement on the list) can work in either direction. Where party leaders have an interest in reform, their ability to impose party discipline increases the probability of reform; but where party leaders have no interest in reform, their influence makes reform less likely.
The evidence I have examined has proved consistent with these predictions. All the instances of initial civil service reform in democracies occurred during periods of party parity with regard to patronage. Reforms did not occur in democracies with open list proportional representation. Factionalism seemed to undercut the ability of two-party systems to produce recurrent situations of equality. Finally, when the parties returned to their normal situation of inequality after a temporary period of parity, reforms were not extended and, in fact, were often cut back.
Moreover, evidence from these cases has proved inconsistent with other explanations of reform. It is, for example, sometimes suggested that administrative reform occurs when countries attain a level of economic development that makes the continuation of government incompetence economically costly. The dates of initial reforms in these cases, however (Uruguay 1934 , Brazil 1937 , Colombia 1930 -34 and 1958 , Venezuela 1970 In contrast to the arguments advanced to explain reform in the United States, Latin American specialists have sometimes suggested that the Iberian colonial heritage shared by Latin American countries predisposes them toward clientelism and against impersonal procedures such as meritocratic recruitment to civil service. There may be some truth in this argument, but it obviously cannot explain the very considerable differences among Latin American cases.
The game-theoretic model has thus proved sufficiently useful to deserve further research. Claims about its generality have to be somewhat cautious because of 388 the small number of culturally and historically similar cases examined here. It may be that the domain of this model is limited to the Western hemisphere. Nonetheless, its implications are quite far-reaching. It suggests that administrative reforms will be difficult to achieve and maintain in democracies, especially democracies with fragmented party systems. Certain characteristics that are often thought of as increasing representativeness, such as multiparty systems that reflect a wide spectrum of interests and open list proportional representation, may paradoxically cause elected officials to be less responsive to the public interest.
One of the promises of democracy is that it makes government services available to all citizens regardless of wealth or status. The failure to professionalize public administration, however, makes that promise hard to keep. Stories abound in Latin America about the need for bribes or pull in order to get everyday services such as renewal of a driver's license. More seriously, inefficiency and incompetence in government agencies can be so extreme that clients' needs cannot be served at all.
For example, Montevideo's El Pais reported in 1960 that the Fund for Pensions for Rural, Domestic, and Aged Workers was up to two years behind in the commencement of payments to nearly four thousand people (Taylor 1960, 222) . During the democratic period, Chileans eligible for pensions routinely sought the help of elected officials to avoid the months or even years of red tape involved for the politically unconnected to initiate payments (Tapia-Videla 1969, 300-13; Valenzuela 1977, 120-37) . All but one of Brazil's many social security institutes had gone bankrupt-in part because of excessive employment of untrained Labor party supporters-by 1964 (Malloy 1979) . In these instances (and many others that could be cited) the failure of public service directly affects the quality of life of the ordinary people whom democracy is supposed to benefit.
